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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PAM JOY REALTY,
a California corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant

Case No. 940662-CA

v.
5900 Associates, L.C.,
a Utah limited liability
company, and John Does 1-10,
unknown individuals,

Priority No. 15

Defendants and Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County.
July 27, 1994.

The judgment was entered on

The notice of appeal was filed on August 23, 1994.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k)(1992).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the parol evidence rule bar the intentional or

negligent misrepresentation claims of a buyer of real estate who
signs an "as is" agreement of sale? [R. 57-59; 137-38.] This issue
presents a question of law for the court to review under a
correctness standard. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650
(Utah 1994) .
2.

Does the doctrine of merger bar the intentional or

negligent misrepresentation claims of a buyer of real estate who
signs an "as is" agreement of sale? [R. 57-59; 137-38.] This issue
presents a question of law for the court to review under a
correctness standard.

Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650

(Utah 1994) .
3.
that

Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law

plaintiff

cannot

prevail

on

its

claim

of

intentional

misrepresentation in this case? [R. 59-62; 140-41.]

This issue

presents a question of law for the court to review under a
correctness standard. TS1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah
App. 1994).
4.
that

Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law

plaintiff

cannot

prevail

on

its

claim

of

misrepresentation in this case? [R. 59-62; 140-41.]

negligent
This issue

presents a question of law for the court to review under a
correctness standard.

TS1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P. 2d 156

(Utah App. 1994) .
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5.

Does

the parol

evidence

or merger

doctrine

bar

the

reformation claim of a buyer cf real estate who signs an "as is'1
agreement
question

of sale?
of

law

[R. 57-59;

for the

137-40]

court to

This issue presents a

review under

a

correctness

stardard. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994).
6.

Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law

that plaintiff cannot prevail on its claim for reformation of the
written
presents

contract

in this

a question

correctness standard.

of

case?

law

[R. 59; 139-40.]

for the

court

to

This

review

issue

under

a

Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650

(Utah 1994) .
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
The issues related to the trial court's erroneous grant of
summary judgment in this case are determined under Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff and appellant, Pam Joy
Realty, against the defendant and appellee, 5900 Associates, L.C.,
to enforce the terms of an oral promise to provide a standard
commercial five-year roof warranty or to recover damages for fraud
in connection with Pam Joy's purchase of a building from 5900
Associates.

The defendant seller moved for summary judgment prior

to filing an answer which was granted by the court on the grounds
that plaintiff's claims were barred by the parol evidence rule and
merger doctrine, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and
that

defendant

was

entitled

to

judgment

as a matter

of

law.

Plaintiff appeals from the adverse summary judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are marshalled and presented in a light
most favorable to the losing party below in accordance with the
appropriate standard of review of summary judgments on appeal.
Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'1 Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992)
(citing King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah
1992)) .
1.

The real property which is the subject of this appeal is

located at 201 East 5900 South, Murray, Utah (the "Property"). [R.
2.]
4

2.

Plaintiff and appellant, Pam Joy Realty ("Pam Joy"), is

a California corporation doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah*
Alan Smalley ("Smalley") is a principal of Pam Joy. [R. 2; 71.]
3.

Defendant and appellee, 5900 Associates, L.C. ("5900

Associates"), is a Utah limited liability company, which owned the
Property prior to June 28, 1993. [R. 3; 41.]

Barlow Briggs

("Briggs") is the manager of this company. [R. 21;41.]
4.

In early 1993, plaintiff and defendant began negotiating

for the purchase and sale of the Property.
Smalley

was

plaintiff's

representative

representative

of the defendant.

In that negotiation
and

Affidavit

Briggs

was

of Alan

the

Smalley

("Smalley Affidavit") at 552,3. [R. 74-75.]; Affidavit of Barlow
Briggs ("Briggs Affidavit") at 5 4 [R. 42.]
5.

In connection with plaintiff's negotiations to purchase

the Property, Smalley had several conversations with Briggs about
plaintiff's

need

to

receive

a

standard

warranty for the roof of the building
Property.

commercial

five-year

(the "Building") on the

The Warranty would cover both labor and materials and

would exclude only damage caused by the owner or his agents, and
any damage resulting from mechanical or heating/air conditioning or
ventilation

systems operation or malfunction

Briggs as the representative

(the "Warranty").

for defendant, told

Smalley that

defendant had such a Warranty as a result of having recently reroofed the entire Building. Briggs promised to immediately provide
Smalley with the Warranty.

Smalley Affidavit at 54. [R. 75.]

5

6.

In addition, on at least one occasion Smalley made a

request in writing for the Warranty for the roof of the Building.
A true and correct copy of this writing dated April 22, 1993 is
attached

to the

responded

Smalley Affidavit

in writing

on April

as Exhibit

28, 1993 that

"AH .
the

Defendant
request was

"acceptable". A true and correct copy of that response is attached
to the Smalley Affidavit as Exhibit "B". Smalley Affidavit at H5.
[R. 75.]
7.

On several occasions Briggs represented to Smalley that

the roof of the Building had been completely re-roofed by Layton
Roofing and that Layton had given defendant a Warranty for the roof
for a period

of

five years as part of its roofing contract.

Smalley Affidavit at 56. [R. 75.]
8.
be

Briggs further stated to Smalley that the Warranty would

assigned

to

plaintiff

purchase of the Property.
9.
to the

in

connection

with

the

plaintiff's

Smalley Affidavit at H7. [R. 76.]

All of these representations by Briggs took place prior
sale of the Property.

As plaintiff's

representative,

Smalley relied upon Briggs' representations that the Warranty would
be delivered.

Smalley would not have proceeded

to close the

purchase of the Property without Briggs' representations that the
Warranty would be delivered to the plaintiff.

Sraalley Affidavit at

58. [R. 76.]
10.

In reliance upon Briggs' representation that the Warranty

would be assigned to plaintiff as part of its purchase of the

6

Property, plaintiff proceeded to close its purchase of the Property
on or about June 28, 1993.
11.

Smalley Affidavit at 59. [R. 76.]

Exhibit "A" reproduced herein at Addendum A is a copy of

the preliminary Earnest Money Sales Agreement covering the purchase
and sale of the Property. [R. 21.]
12.

Exhibit "B" reproduced herein at Addendum B is a copy of

the Closing Statement between the buyer and the seller of the
Property. [R. 21.]
13.

Exhibit "C" reproduced herein at Addendum C is a copy of

the Warranty Deed covering the sale of the Property. [R. 22.]
14.

The Warranty was not delivered at the closing of the sale

of the Property.
15.

Smalley Affidavit at 110. [R. 76.]

Thereafter, plaintiff continued to request that defendant

deliver the Warranty.

Those requests are set forth in numerous

letters and memoranda from Smalley to Briggs.

Copies of some of

these letters are attached to the Smalley Affidavit as Exhibit "C".
Smalley Affidavit at 511. [R. 76.]
16.

In response to each such communication from Smalley,

defendant continued to promise that the Warranty would be forth
coming.

For example, in defendant's letter to plaintiff of August

12, 1993, Briggs indicates, "Layton Roofing Company is preparing a
five year warranty".
attached

to

the

A copy of Briggs' August 12, 1993 letter is

Smalley

Affidavit

Affidavit at 112. [R. 76.]

7

as

Exhibit

"D."

Smalley

17.

Despite Briggs' numerous representations that a Warranty

would be provided, none has been delivered.

Smalley Affidavit at

113. [R. 77.]
18.

Plaintiff recently discovered that Layton Roofing did not

re-roof the entire roof of the Building, but rather made only
certain limited repairs thereto.

Smalley Affidavit at 514. [R.

77. ]
19.

Moreover, Layton Roofing has indicated to Smalley that it

will issue a Warranty but only if it is paid a sum in excess of
$19,000, which will enable it to do such additional work to the
roof as is necessary for Layton Roofing to issue the Warranty.
Smalley Affidavit at fl5. [R. 77.]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE OR MERGER DOCTRINE.
A.

Intentional Misrepresentation.
1.

Parol Evidence.

An "as is" provision in a real estate contract does not bar a
claim based on allegations of fraud. Parol evidence is admissible
on the issue.
2.

Merger Doctrine.

Fraud is an exception to the applicability of the merger
doctrine.
B.

Parol evidence is admissible on the issue.
Negligent Misrepresentation.
1.

Parol Evidence.
8

Although Utah courts have not directly held that a claim of
negligent misrepresentation justifies an exception to the parol
evidence rule, this case presents an opportunity to do so.
court

should

clearly

adopt

the

negligent

This

misrepresentation

exception to the parol evidence rule on grounds of substantive law
and public policy.
2.

Merger Doctrine.

The merger doctrine

should

not preclude

consideration

of

plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation case for the same reasons
which bar application of the parol evidence rule in fraud cases.
II.
PLAINTIFF'S

CLAIM OF

INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION

IS NOT

BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.
Plaintiff has met its burden of showing the existence of
genuine issues of material fact on each of the disputed elements of
its intentional misrepresentation claim.

Furthermore, the case of

Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App.
1994) is clearly distinguishable on its facts and therefore not
dispositive of the reasonable reliance issue.

9

III.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT BARRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL FACTS HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED BY PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT.
Plaintiff

has met its burden of showing the existence of

genuine issues of material fact on each of the disputed elements of
its intentional misrepresentation claim.

In addition, plaintiff is

entitled to recover its actual economic loss damages in the absence
of any physical damage to the roof.
IV.
PLAINTIFF'S REFORMATION OF CONTRACT CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE OR MERGER DOCTRINE.
A.

Parol Evidence Rule.

Mistake is an exception to the parol evidence rule.

Parol

evidence to show such mistake may be introduced in an action in
equity to reform the written contract.
B.

Merger Doctrine.

Mistake
evidence

is

an

exception

is admissible

to

the merger

in a reformation

doctrine.

action

Parol

on grounds of

mistake.
V.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF ENTITLEMENT TO EQUITABLE REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT IS NOT BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.
Plaintiff

has met its burden of showing the existence of

genuine issues of material fact on each of the disputed elements of
10

its reformation of contract claim.

The parties made a mutual

mistake in failing to include appropriate roof warranty language in
the Closing Statement in view of the mistaken assumption that such
a warranty was being assigned as part of the contract and therefore
need not be specifically mentioned.

In the alternative, plaintiff

made a unilateral mistake regarding the omission of roof warranty
language

which

was

induced

affirmative fraudulent conduct.

by

defendant's

inequitable

or

Proof of a unilateral mistake of

this nature constitutes good grounds for reformation of a contract
in Utah.

11

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff's complaint against defendant 5900 Associates sets
forth eight related claims for relief including: breach of oral
contract, general equitable relief, intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, and mutual mistake. [R. 2-11.] These
claims arose from certain representations and promises allegedly
make by Briggs to Smalley during the course of negotiations for the
purchase and sale of the Property. Smalley Affidavit. [R. 74-92.]
In this case, plaintiff agrees that the written contract
documents reproduced in Addenda A, B, and C respectively contain an
"as is" provision and are not otherwise ambiguous.

Plaintiff

contends, however, that its acceptance of the Property is an "as
is" condition is subject to proof of fraud in the inducement of the
purchase, or, in the alternative, proof of mistake justifying
reformation of the contract to include the roof warranty. Proof of
these allegations is not barred as a matter of law since neither
the parol evidence rule nor the merger doctrine applies to such
claims, and because plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material
fact by affidavit.

Plaintiff's contentions are more fully set

forth in points I through V below.

12

I.
PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE OR MERGER DOCTRINES.
A.

Intentional Misrepresentation.
1.

The

trial

Parol Evidence Rule
court's

conclusion

that

the

"as is" provision

contained in the Closing Statement controls the case and prevents
enforcement of an oral promise to provide a roof warranty is not
applicable to plaintiff's fraud claim, in view of the Utah Supreme
Court's holding that fraud is an exception to the parol evidence
rule:
The parol evidence rule as a principle of contract
interpretation has a very narrow application.
Simply
stated, the rule operates in the absence of fraud to
exclude contemporaneous conversations, statements, or
representations offered for the purpose of varying or
adding to the terms of an integrated
contract...
This general rule as stated contains an exception
for fraud.
Parol evidence is admissible to show the
circumstances under which the contract was made or the
purpose for which the writing was executed. This is so
even after the writing is determined to be an integrated
contract. Admitting parol evidence in such circumstances
avoids the judicial enforcement of a writing that appears
to be a binding integration but in fact is not.
What appears to be a complete and binding integrated
agreement may be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an
agreement without consideration, or it may be voidable
for fraud, duress, mistake, or the like, or it may be
illegal. Such invalidating causes need not and commonly
do not appear on the face of the writing.
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 cmt. c (1981)).

13

(citing

This is consistent with the well-accepted general rule that an
"as isM provision in a real estate contract does not bar a buyer's
claim based on allegations of fraud. Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation,
Construction and Effect of Provision in Contract for Sale of Realty
by Which Purchaser Agrees to Take Property "As Is" or in Its
Existing Condition. 8 ALR 5th 312, 328 (1992); 29A Am. Jur 2d
Evidence §1092 (1994).
2.

Merger Doctrine

The same exception applies in the case of the merger doctrine.
Thus in Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme
Court held on grounds of public policy that "a contract clause
limiting

liability

will

not

be

applied

notwithstanding the merger doctrine. Id.

in

a

fraud action"

at 608. See also Embassy

Group Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Utah App. 1993).
Consequently, the alleged misrepresentations of defendant's
managing agent may be considered to determine whether plaintiff has
stated a valid cause of action for intentional misrepresentation
and

demonstrated

the

existence

of

material

issues

of

fact

precluding summary judgment.
B.

Negligent Misrepresentation.
1.

Parol Evidence Rule.

In Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570
(Utah App. 1994), this court assumed without deciding that the
plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation was an exception
to the "as is" clause in an agreement to purchase real estate,
thereby avoiding the effect of the parol evidence rule.
14

Id.

at

575.
on

Although the degree to which the trial court may have relied

the

parol

evidence

rule

in

granting

summary

judgment

on

plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim is unclear, plaintiff
nevertheless contends that negligent misrepresentation presents an
exception in the same way and for the same reasons as intentional
fraud. [R. Ill; Tr. 9, R. 137.]
A number of courts have recently addressed this question and
found in favor of the exception.

In Formento v. Encanto Business

Park, 744 P. 2d 22 (Ariz. App. 1987), for example, the Arizona
Court of Appeals squarely held that the parol evidence rule was not
applicable to a negligent misrepresentation claim. Id.

at 26.

In Formento, aggrieved purchasers brought suit against the
sellers

of an industrial

park on grounds

of

fraud, negligent

misrepresentation, and breach of warranty, arising out of alleged
negligent

misrepresentations

and

express

warranties

made

before and after execution of the purchase agreement. Id.
25.

both

at 23,

The written agreement itself contained a standard integration

clause excluding all agreements, statements, representations, and
promises outside the original written document. Id.
trial

court

ruled

that

the

parol

evidence

at 24.

rule

The

precluded

consideration of any evidence of representations or warranties
outside the agreement and granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. Id.

at 25.

Plaintiffs appealed.

Id.

On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals carefully considered
plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in applying the parol
evidence

rule

to

exclude

evidence
15

of

defendant's

alleged

misrepresentations.

Id.

The court's analysis of this question is

instructive:
Formento claims that there is no logical reason to
distinguish
between
negligent
and
fraudulent
misrepresentations because, in both instances, the harm
done to the party relying on the misrepresentations is
the same. Their argument is based on Hill v.
Jones,
supra, a recent Division One case. In Hill,
the issue
was whether a seller has a duty to disclose to the buyer
the existence of termite damage in a residential dwelling
known to the seller, but not to the buyer, which
materially affects the value of the property. The Hills
had alleged that the sellers, the Joneses, made
representations that what was actually termite damage in
the residence was water damage, and had failed to
disclose the existence of the termite damage and the
history of the infestation in the residence. The trial
court dismissed the misrepresentation claim based on an
integration clause in the agreement between the parties.
The appellate court reversed, holding that a duty to
disclose did exist. The court stated:
"Although the law of contracts supports the finality
of transactions, over the years courts have recognized
that under certain limited circumstances it is unjust to
strictly enforce the policy favoring finality...
There is also a judicial policy promoting honesty and
fair dealing in business relationships. This policy is
expressed in the law of fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations.
Where a misrepresentation is
fraudulent or where a negligent misrepresentation is one
of material fact, the policy of finality rightly gives
way to the policy of promoting honest dealing between the
parties. [citation omitted] [Nondisclosure may be
equated with and given the same legal effect as fraud and
misrepresentation. One category of cases where this has
been done involves the area of nondisclosure of material
facts affecting the value of property, known to the
seller but not reasonably capable of being known to the
buyer."
The Hill court recognized that a seller should not
be allowed to hide behind an integration clause to avoid
the consequences of a misrepresentation, whether
fraudulent or negligent. We agree. Formento is entitled
to a trial on the merits of the issue of negligent
misrepresentation, and the parol evidence rule cannot be
used by Encanto as a shield against its own
representations.
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Formento, 744 P.2d at 26.
The Formento

court reached the same conclusion using a

contract law analysis.
We are also able to reach the same conclusion using
a different analysis. The parol evidence rule is a rule
of substantive contract law, and a claim of negligent
misrepresentation sounds in tort. Therefore, as stated
in Van Buren

v. Pima Community

College

Dist.

Bd. , supra,

a claim for negligent misrepresentation is governed by
the law of negligence, and the parol evidence rule is
inapplicable.
Arizona has adopted § 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1977).
Other jurisdictions that
recognize an action for the tort of negligent
misrepresentation have admitted parol evidence to prove
the claim.

See, e.g., Nashua

Trust

Co.

v.

Weisman,

122

N.H. 397, 445 A.2d 1101 (1982); APLications,
Inc.
v.
Hewitt-Packard
Co., 501 F.Supp. 129 (S.D. N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 672 F.2d 1076 (1982); National

v. Byler,

v. Cumberland

Builders,

Inc.,

1976); but see, Wilkinson
P.2d 512 (1976).
Id.

Bldg.

Leasing,

Inc.

252 Pa.Super. 370, 381 A.2d 963 (1977); Haynes
546 S.W. 2d 228 (Tenn. App.

v. Carpenter,

276 Or. 311, 554

at 26-27 (textual citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends that the Utah Court of Appeals should adopt

the same exception discussed above and hold that the parol evidence
rule

does

not

representations

preclude
made

evidence

prior

to,

of

any

understandings

contemporaneously

with,

or
or

subsequent to the execution of a written, integrated real estate
contract insofar as such representations are relevant to a claim of
negligent misrepresentation. The parol evidence rule should not be
used as a shield against a party's negligent misrepresentations of
material fact for the same public policy and substantive law
reasons relied upon in Formento and similar cases. Insofar as the
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trial court's ruling may be construed to rest upon this ground, it
was erroneous and should be reversed.
2.

Merger Doctrine.

As indicated above, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the
merger doctrine is inapplicable to fraud actions on grounds of
public policy.

Lamb v. Banqart, 575 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974).

Plaintiff contends that the same public policy reasons which bar
application of the parol evidence rule in fraud and negligent
misrepresentation cases applies here.
should

not

preclude

consideration

Thus the merger doctrine
of

plaintiff's

negligent

misrepresentation case.
II.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT
BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.
A.

Elements of Intentional Misrepresentation

The elements of a cause of action based upon intentional
misrepresentation are:
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which
the representor either (a)knew to be false, or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge
upon which to base such representation; (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance
of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980).
The particular factual allegations supporting these elements
are set forth in paragraphs 7 through 18 of plaintiff's complaint
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and are incorporated by reference in its sixth cause of action. [R.
3-5;8.]

The defendant denies that such promises were ever made,

and further denies "each and every element of fraud." [R. 125; 29.]
Defendant further claims that

"several of the elements do not

involve disputed facts." [R. 29.]
In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the
trial court agreed concluding:
(e) That plaintiff's tort claims must fail because
of lack of damages; lack of reasonable reliance in light
of the "as is" contract; lack of misrepresentation of a
presently existing fact; and lack of evidence of an
intent to deceive. [R. 111.]
Plaintiff contends that each of these conclusions is erroneous
and should be reversed.
B.

Disputed Issues of Fact.
1.

According

Presently Existing Material Facts
to

Alan

Smalley's

affidavit,

the

following

representations were made by Barlow Briggs during negotiations for
plaintiff's purchase of the Property:
(1)

The building had been completely re-roofed by Layton

Roofing. Smalley Affidavit 54. [R. 75.]
(2)

Layton Roofing had made a warranty on the roof. Smalley

Affidavit 5 4,6. [R. 75.]
(3)

The roof warranty was in existence. Smalley Affidavit 54.

[R. 75.]
(4)

Layton Roofing had given the roof warranty to defendant

for a period of five (5) years as part of the roofing contract.
Smalley Affidavit 56. [R. 75.]
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(5)

Defendant's present promissory intention was to provide

plaintiff with the warranty. Smalley Affidavit f 4. [R. 75.]
(6)

Defendant's present promissory intention was to assign

the warranty to plaintiff in connection with plaintiff's purchase
of the property. Smalley Affidavit 5 5,7. [R. 76.]
(7)

All of the above representations by Briggs took place

prior to the sale. Smalley Affidavit fl 8. [R. 76.]
Defendant argued below and the court apparently accepted the
contention that this element must fail as a matter of law since a
promise to provide plaintiff with a roof warranty in the future
"could not be a representation of a presently existing fact." [R.
29, 111.]

This conclusion ignores the circumstance that a promise

to provide such a warranty in connection with a sale of real estate
necessarily

involves

a particular

intention of the promisor.

state

of mind, the

present

It is also contrary to the well settled

rule that a "misrepresentation of a present promissory intention is
a misrepresentation of a presently existing fact. " Galloway v.
AFCO Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d

506, 508 (Utah App. 1989). See also

Audalex Resources v. Meyers, 871 P.2d

1041, 1047-48

(Utah App.

1994) .
In addition, this was not the sole misrepresentation.

There

were others as listed above such as the existence of the warranty
itself

which

clearly

pertain

to

presently

existing

facts.

Consequently, the trial court's reliance on this ground in awarding
summary judgment was misplaced.
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2.

Intent to Deceive (Scienter).

In this

action

it

is uncontroverted

that defendant

5900

Associates owned the office building which was the subject of the
purchase agreement and that Barlow Briggs was the manager of this
company. Briggs Affidavit 55 1,2. [R. 41.]

He was therefore, in a

superior position to know the extent to which roofing repairs had
been made, and whether defendant had received a roof warranty
covering the work. According to Alan Smalley, Briggs made numerous
representations about the state of the roof warranty prior to sale
which later turned out to be completely false. Smalley Affidavit 55
3-15. [R. 74-77.]

At one point during negotiations, he even told

Smalley that his request for the roof warranty was "acceptable,"
but later stated in his affidavit that "it was never affiant's
intention to have this [roof warranty] as a condition of the sales
contract." Smalley Affidavit 55. [R. 75.] Briggs Affidavit 57. [R.
42.]

These contrary views of the matter in the absence of any

discovery are sufficient to create the inference of defendant's
intent

to deceive based

upon Brigg's

actual

knowledge of the

situation or of his recklessness knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representations.
3.

Reasonable Reliance.

In granting summary judgment against the plaintiff in this
case,

the

trial

court

relied

heavily

on this

court's

recent

decision in Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570
(Utah App. 1994).
purchase

real

As here, Maack involved an "as is" contract to

estate,

an

alleged
21

misrepresentation

that

the

premises

were

covered

by

a one

year

builder's

warranty,

and

allegations of intentional and negligent misrepresentation by the
buyers against whom summary judgment was entered.
Defendant

argued

below

that

Maack

was

Id.
dispositive

of

plaintiff's fraud claim on the element of reliance. [R. 133-34.]
The court agreed concluding that plaintiff

failed to establish

reasonable reliance as a matter of law. [R. 111.]
The error in the trial court's conclusion is that Maack is
distinguishable on the particular facts which control the outcome.
In Maack, the plaintiff home buyers purchased a newly-constructed
home "as is" without any warranties as to its condition.
The Maacks did not have the home inspected before
they agreed to purchase it, nor did they make the
purchase contingent upon a satisfactory inspection
report. They allege that they concluded an inspection
was unnecessary based upon a representation made by
Jarvik's real estate agent, Maclyn Kesselring. Although
the parties disagree on the timing of Kesselring's
statement—the Maacks claim it was before the signing of
the Agreement while Kesselring claims it was after—it is
undisputed that Kesselring told the Maacks that the house
was subject to a one year builder's warranty covering
defects, material, and workmanship. The Maacks did not
ask to review the builder's warranty, nor did they ask
for particular details concerning the warranty. The sale
was later completed and the Maacks moved in.
Id.

at 573
Shortly after moving into the home, the Maacks encountered

problems with water leakage.

This led ultimately to a lawsuit in

which they sought damages from the contractor and previous owner.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and plaintiffs appealed.

This court affirmed the trial court's

ruling holding in pertinent part that the plaintiff's negligent
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misrepresentation claim must fail for lack of reasonable reliance.
Id.

at 577-78,
In Maack, it was undisputed that the plaintiffs failed to take

any

steps to ascertain

the truth

of the real

estate

agent's

misrepresentation before relying on it to their detriment:
It is undisputed that the Maacks did not ask for
details regarding the scope of the alleged builder's
warranty, did not ask to review a copy of the warranty,
and did not reguire that reference to the warranty be
included in the Agreement. Additionally, the Maacks did
not inquire as to the date of expiration of the warranty.
Because the house was completed in approximately July
1987, the Maacks were on notice that it was entirely
possible that the warranty had expired or was very close
to expiration at the time they signed the Agreement. In
addition, Mr. Maack, as an experienced attorney, was on
notice that reliance was unreasonable by the Agreement's
express provisions that the property was sold" as is,"
with no warranties other than those expressly stated, and
that it superseded any prior oral or written agreements.
For these reasons, we conclude as a matter of law that
the Maacks did not reasonably rely on Kesselring's
statement and did not exercise due diligence with respect
to the existence of the alleged builder's warranty.
Id.

at 577.
In strong contrast to the facts in Maack, the evidence in the

record of this case plainly shows that plaintiff did take the
following steps:
1.

Smalley

specifically

raised

the

issue

of

the

roof

warranty with Briggs in connection with plaintiff's negotiations to
purchase the property. Smalley Affidavit 14. [R. 75.]
2.

The roof warranty was intended to cover both labor and

materials and would "exclude only damage caused by the owner or his
agents, and any damage resulting from mechanical or heating/air
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conditioning or ventilation systems operation or malfunction (the
'Warranty')."
3.

Smalley Affidavit 54- [R. 75.]

Briggs promised to provide Smalley with the warranty,

ostensibly for inspection. Smalley Affidavit I 4. [R. 75.]
4.

Smalley followed up on this discussion with a written

request for the warranty prior to sale. Smalley Affidavit 1 5, [R.
75. ]
5.

Briggs responded in writing that Smalley's request was

"acceptable."
6.

Smalley Affidavit H 5. [R. 75.]

Smalley continued to request the warranty and Briggs

continued to reassure him right up to the closing and for several
weeks beyond.

Smalley Affidavit ff 6-12. [R. 75-76.]

Based on the foregoing efforts by the plaintiff to ask for
details about the warranty; request a copy for review; insist upon
delivery of the warranty both before and after sale; and include
language

in both

contract documents

requiring the

Seller to

personally warrant those items specifically excluded by a standard
roof warranty which it believed existed; plaintiff contends that a
material issue of fact exists which precludes judgment as a matter
of law on the reliance issue.

Whether plaintiff took reasonable

steps under the circumstances to ascertain the truth of defendant's
representations

becomes

a

question

of

fact

once

plaintiff

demonstrates that it took some steps to do so as opposed to no
steps as was the case in Maack.

The trial court's ruling to the

contrary is erroneous and should be reversed.

24

4.

Damages.

Defendant

argued

below

and

the

court

concluded

that

plaintiff's fraud claims must fail because of a lack of any damage.
The basis of this ruling apparently was that because the roof does
not presently leak or need any repairs, the claim is moot. [R. 29;
131-32]
Defendant's analysis fails to account for plaintiff's economic
loss of the benefit of the bargain.

In Utah, the measure of

damages for fraud and deceit is the
difference between the actual value of what the
party received and the value thereof if it had been as
represented; this is the benefit of the bargain rule.
Under this rule the defrauded party is compensated for
the loss of his bargain and is not confined to his outof-the-pocket damages.
Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974).
According

to Alan

Smalley's

affidavit, Layton Roofing is

unwilling to issue a roof warranty without payment of a sum in
excess of $19,000 which will enable it to perform the additional
work reguired to support the warranty.
77.]

Smalley Affidavit I 15. [R.

If defendant's representations about the roof warranty had

been true and been honored, the purchase price paid by plaintiff
would

have

included

the value of this warranty.

Defendant's

failure to provide the warranty means that the actual value of the
property was less than the value as represented, and has caused
plaintiff to suffer economic losses to its damage in excess of
$19,000.

Thus plaintiff has established a claim for damages under

applicable law based in part upon disputed issues of fact.
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It is

therefore entitled to a reversal of the summary judgment against it
on its claim of intentional misrepresentation.
III.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT BARRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL FACTS HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.
A.

Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation.

The

elements

of

a

cause

of

action

based

upon

negligent

misrepresentation have been defined as follows:
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a
transaction, (2) is in a superior position to know
material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes
a false representation concerning them, (4) expecting the
other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the other
party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if
the other elements of fraud are also present.
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d
(subdivisions added).

659, 662 (Utah 1967)

See also Christenson v. Commonwealth Land

Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d

302, 305 (Utah 1983).

See generally

Restatement (Second) of Torts §552 (1965).
The particular factual allegations supporting these elements
are set forth in paragraphs 7 through 18 of plaintiff's complaint
and are incorporated by reference in its seventh cause of action.
[R. 3-5; 8.]

The defendant denies that such promises were ever

made, and further denies "each and every element of fraud." [R.
125; 29.] Defendant further claims that "several of the elements do
not involve disputed facts." [R. 29.]
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In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the
lower court agreed concluding:
(e) That plaintiff's tort claims must fail because
of lack of damages; lack of reasonable reliance in light
of the "as is" contract' lack of misrepresentation of a
presently existing fact; and lack of evidence of an
intent to deceive. [R. 111.]
Plaintiff contends that each of these conclusions is erroneous
and should be reversed.
B.

Disputed Issues of Fact.

In reaching the above conclusions, the trial court failed to
distinguish further between plaintiff's intentional and negligent
misrepresentation claims and ruled that dismissal was warranted on
the same grounds for both.
the

same factual and

Conseguently, plaintiff asserts that

legal arguments presented

in support of

reversal on its intentional misrepresentation claim apply equally
here.

In addition, however, since the defendant contends that the

plaintiff's fraud claims must both fail because of lack of any
physical damage to the roof, further discussion of the damage
element is warranted. [R. 29; 131-32.]
Even through this particular variation of common law fraud
sounds in negligence, courts have long recognized that economic
loss damages are recoverable.

See, e.g. , Price-Orem Inv. Co. v.

Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986) (negligent
survey); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d
302 (Utah 1983) (negligent acknowledgment of document); Dugan v.
Jones,

615

P.2d

1239

(Utah

1980)

acreage).
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(negligent

discrepancy

in

Consequently,

defendant's

contention

which

would

limit

recovery of damages for negligent misrepresentation in this case to
physical damage to the property is without merit.

Since plaintiff

has established a claim for damages based in part upon disputed
issues of fact, it is entitled to a reversal of the adverse summary
judgment on its claim of negligent misrepresentation.
IV.
PLAINTIFF'S REFORMATION OF CONTRACT CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE OR MERGER DOCTRINE.
A.

Parol Evidence Rule.

The

parol

extrinsic

evidence

evidence

to

rule
vary

generally
or

unambiguous, integrated contract.

precludes

contradict

the

the

use

of

terms

of

an

Hall v. Process Instruments and

Control, Inc., 866 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1993).

The rule is subject

to many limitations and exceptions, however, including cases in
which the writing is subject to claims of mistake.
Parol evidence generally is admissible to alter the terms of
a written contract when it is shown that, by reason of a mistake,
the true intention of the parties was not expressed. Grahn v.
Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516
(Utah 1991); Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1992). See
also 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1112 (1994).

Parol evidence to

show such mistake may be introduced in an action in eguity to
reform the written contract. Janke v. Beckstead, 332 P. 2d 933 (Utah
1958). See also 66 Am. Jur.2d Reformation of Instruments § 118
(1973) .
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B. Merger Doctrine,
The

doctrine

of

merger

is

applied

to

establish

the

completeness of final real estate contracts by extinguishing all
prior agreements, whether written or oral, and merging them into
the deed of conveyance. Embassy Group v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366 (Utah
App.

1993).

This rule is subject to the exceptions of fraud,

mistake, and the existence of collateral rights in the contract of
sale.

Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986).
In suits to reform written

instruments

on the ground of

mistake, parol evidence is admissible to show the nature of the
mistake and how the writing should be corrected to conform to the
agreement or intention which the parties actually had.
Beckstead,

332 P.2d

933

(Utah

1958).

See also

Janke v.

66 Am.Jur.2d

Reformation of Instruments § 118 (1973).
V.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF ENTITLEMENT TO EQUITABLE REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT IS NOT BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.
A.

Elements of Reformation Claim.

Under Utah law, a party seeking reformation of a contract has
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that:
1.

the instrument does not conform to the intent of

both parties;
2.

the claimant was mistaken regarding the content of

the instrument and the other party knew of the mistake but kept
silent; or
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3.

the claimant was mistaken as to actual content due

to "fraudulent affirmative behavior."
Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 64-65 (Utah 1977). See also, Mabev
v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 290 (Utah 1984); Embassy
Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1371-72, (Utah App. 1993).
The Utah Supreme Court has further stated that a contract may
be reformed for either of the following reasons:
First, if the instrument does not embody the
intentions of both parties to the contract, a mutual
mistake has occurred, and reformation is appropriate.
Second, if one party is laboring under a mistake about a
contract term and that mistake either has been induced by
the other party or is known by and conceded to by the
other party, then the inequitable nature of the other
party's conduct will have the same operable effect as a
mistake, and reformation is permissible. E.G., Thompson
v. Smith,
Utah, 620 P.2d 520, 523 (1980).
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985).
The particular
claims

of

mutual

factual
mistake

defendant's

inequitable

through

of
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allegations
or

supporting

unilateral

mistake

plaintiff's
induced

by

conduct are set forth in paragraphs 7

plaintiff's

complaint

and

are

incorporated

reference in its third cause of action. [R. 3-5; 7.]

by

Defendant

denies that the underlying promises leading to the mistake were
ever made (in itself creating a disputed issue of fact) and asserts
the absence of any material issues of fact supporting the claim.
[R. 27; 125.]
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In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the
trial court agreed, concluding
(d) That plaintiff's claim for reformation must
fail for lack of a mutual mistake, lack of materiality,
lack of prejudice, existence of two written contracts,
and lack of any claimed facts that would overcome the
clear and convincing evidence burden.
[R. 111.]
Plaintiff contends that these conclusions are erroneous and
should be reversed.
B.

Disputed Issues of Fact.
1.

Lack of Mutual Mistake.

Since plaintiff has presented sworn testimony to the effect
that both parties intended to include the roof warranty as part of
their transaction, a material issue of fact exists regarding the
parties intentions and whether the mistake was mutual.
Affidavit flf 4-10. [R. 75-76.]

Smalley

Briggs Affidavit f 7. [R. 41.] The

mutual mistake involved the omission of the standard roof warranty
promised by defendant which was not assigned as part of the sale.
In addition, there is abundant evidence in the record to
support

a claim

of

unilateral

mistake

inequitable or fraudulent conduct.

induced

by

defendant's

Smalley Affidavit HI 4-10. [R.

75-76.] Briggs Affidavit 5 7. [R. 41.]

Accordingly, the court's

ruling on this issue was erroneous.
2*

Lack of Materiality.

Defendant argued below that any mistake would have been
"comparatively immaterial" because of the difference between the
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purchase price

($1,420,000) and the cost of a roof warranty

($19,000). [R. 131.]
A matter is considered to be material "if it is one to which
a reasonable person would attach importance in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question."

Hill v. Jones,

725 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Ariz. App. 1986) (quoting Lynn v. Taylor, 642
P.2d 131, 134-35 (Kan. App. 1982)).
In this case, plaintiff has presented sworn testimony that it
relied on the defendant's

representations

regarding the roof

warranty in proceeding to close the transaction. Smalley Affidavit
f 9. [R. 76.] Plaintiff would not have closed the sale without the
representation. Smalley Affidavit 5 8. [R. 76.] Both its pre-sale
and post-sale actions corrobate the importance plaintiff attached
to the warranty.

Accordingly, the question of materiality is

placed squarely in issue.
3.
Defendant

Lack of Prejudice.
asserts

that

plaintiff

must

demonstrate

some

prejudice if the contract is not reformed. [R. 130.] Plaintiff has
met this burden by presenting sworn testimony that the cost of
obtaining a roof warranty from Layton Roofing is in excess of
$19,000.

Smalley Affidavit

5

15.

[R. 77.]

Defendant has

challenged this figure. [R. 131.] A dispute exists with respect to
this material fact as well.
4.

Antecedent Contracts.

In this case, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was signed on
May 21, 1993, and the Closing Statement on June 30, 1993. [R. 4532

50.] Both agreements include the HVAC warranties and omit the roof
warranty.

Plaintiff contends that an error occurred in drafting

the Closing Statement to omit the roof warranty which had not been
assigned

as

intended.

part

of

the

closing

transaction

as

the

parties

As late as April 22, 1993, Briggs had agreed in writing

that plaintiff's request for a roof warranty was "acceptable."
Smalley f 5. [R. 75.]

He subsequently denied any intention of

including it in the sale.
inclusion

of

the

Briggs Affidavit 5 7 [R. 42.]

HVAC warranties

in

the

Earnest

Money

The
Sales

Agreement reflects plaintiff's understanding and belief that the
roof warranty would be assigned, since such a warranty generally
excludes HVAC operations.
mistaken

omission

of

roof

Smalley Affidavit 5 7. [R. 75.]
warranty

language

in

the

The

Closing

Statement was a result of either a mutual mistake that the roof
warranty was or would be assigned as part of the transaction or
upon

a

unilateral

mistake

induced

by

defendant's

inequitable

conduct in continually making such misrepresentations.
5*

Clear and Convincing Evidence.

Under Utah law, a party moving for summary judgment must
establish the right based on the applicable law as applied to
undisputed material issues of fact.

A party opposing the motion

need only demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact in
order to prevail. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 65455 (Utah 1994).

Furthermore, a motion for summary judgment may be

used only to determine the existence of a material issue of fact,
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not to determine which party's case is more persuasive.

Id.

at

655.
In this case, plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of
several material issues of fact bearing on the various elements of
its reformation claim.

The trial court's summary judgment should

therefore be reversed to allow plaintiff the opportunity to prove
its case by clear and convincing evidence.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has met its burden in response to defendant's motion
for summary judgment by presenting sworn testimony establishing the
existence of genuine issues of material fact on its claims of
intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and
equitable reformation of contract. Plaintiff has also demonstrated
that defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
its affirmative defenses of parol evidence and merger as applied to
the above claims.

The summary judgment entered in favor of

defendant should therefore be reversed and the case remanded to the
trial court for resolution of these disputed issues of material
fact.
DATED this <y*

day of February, 1995.
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